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Abstract 
The organization is the key factor for megaprojects in which thousands of connections and 
relations intertwine and influence the project performance. However, organizational evolution in 
megaprojects has not been fully studied. This study investigates the evolution of the 
organizational network of a megaproject in China using social network analysis (SNA), and then 
proposes corresponding governance strategies. The result shows that megaproject organizations 
evolve towards more connected networks but are differentiated for various investors. For 
government invested projects, the organizational network is well connected and cooperative, yet 
unstable and requires strategic long-term governance policies; for private invested projects, the 
network is stable, but collaboration among participants is low, which indicates a need to establish 
collaborative governance structures. The result complements the organizational evolution theory 
for megaprojects and offers effective strategies for governing megaproject organizations. This 
study also helps practitioners better understand the nature and characteristics of megaproject 
organizations.  
Keywords:  Megaprojects; Social Network Analysis (SNA); organization management; project 
governance; case study 
Paper Type: Research article 
Introduction 
Large-scale city infrastructure construction is a key supporting pillar in a nation’s economic and 
social development. As the scale of the project increases, the complexity of projects becomes 
more evident than before and brings about new challenges. Especially in the city level or regional 
level where single projects have been gradually replaced by megaprojects, the complexity 
expanded exponentially together with various factors, including increasing numbers of 
organizational stakeholders, various funding sources, and diversified project functions. As a 
result, megaprojects began displaying end products that did not perform up to standard 
(Szyliowicz and Goetz, 1995).  
Organizational governance plays a key role in the execution of megaprojects (Miller and Hobbs, 
2005), and has been regarded as the decisive factor affecting project performance (Li et al., 2015). 
Governance of megaproject organization is difficult due to multiple reasons, such as the 
diversification and interaction among project participants, complication of organizational 
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relationships, personal behaviour dynamics and uncertainty in the long construction period. 
Improper organization governance leads to poor performance of megaprojects, such as cost 
overruns, schedule delays, or losing control (Gordon, 2008). It is therefore crucial to establish 
the effective organizational governance during the entire megaproject process.  
To improve the effectiveness of prolonged governing megaproject organizations, this study aims 
to: 1) analyse dynamic characteristics of megaproject organization evolution and regularity based 
on Social Network Analysis (SNA) method and a megaproject case study in China; 2) conduct a 
comparative analysis of dynamic characteristics for two-types of megaproject organizations: 
government invested and private invested projects; and 3) propose effective governance 
strategies for different types of megaproject organizations. The result will enrich the current 
knowledge of megaproject organization governance by analysing the dynamic evolution of 
megaproject organizations, and provide practical strategies for governing megaproject 
organizations. 
The paper is structured in six sections. The next section reviews pertinent studies, followed by 
section three that explains the research design, case selection, and data collection. Section four 
analyses the results of the organizational network, and relevant organizational governance 
policies are discussed in section five. The last section summarizes this study.  
Literature Review 
Organization is the key factor that influences project tasks completion (Chen, 2005) and project 
performance. An inappropriate organization will magnify the risk of unperformed tasks and 
induce cascading failure phenomenon, especially in a complex project environment. 
Traditional project management research regards construction project organization as a formal 
and stable relationship (Dubois and Gadde, 2000). Scholars have also defined the project 
organization as a relationship matrix or a network of relationships (Li et al., 2015), and assume 
that a project organization is composed of multiple transactions between enterprises. The 
construction project organization is therefore analyzed via the perspective of project contract 
mode or organization structure (Buzzell and Gale, 1987; Winch, 1989).  
However, the studies above have ignored the sociality, temporality and network interactions in a 
project organization (Loraine, 1994; Thiry and Deguire, 2007), and simply considered the 
relationship between the individual attributes by using the individual "atomic" thinking. The 
organization is a multi-level, multi-attribute and continuously evolving network, and not a 
network with a static and isolated structure. The numbers and types of organization will change 
constantly in the process of its evolution. Therefore, organizational network theory replaced the 
“atomic” thinking with “network” thinking, becoming a new logic analysis and research 
paradigm that tends toward more relational, contextual and systemic understandings (Borgatti 
and Foster, 2003). 
Research on “network” has grown extensively in the last decade, especially on social network 
(Borgatti and Halgin, 2011). The interest in network analysis spans all of the social sciences and 
helps solve research questions for various disciplines, such as physics, epidemiology, and biology. 
In management research, social networks have been used to understand job performance 
(Sparrowe et al., 2001), creativity (Burt, 2004), and innovation (Obstfeld, 2005). Besides, network 
analysis has become a standard diagnostic tool in management consulting (Baker, 2000). 
In addition, the organizational network governance is a selective, long-lasting and structured 
autonomous enterprise collection (Jones, Hesterly and Borgatti, 1997). Network governance is 
different from the corporate governance since network governance is no longer concerned about 
the shareholders' rights within a single enterprise or the maximum of specific public benefit. It 
focuses on the maximum value of the whole network (Jeffrey and Salancik, 1978) instead. Such 
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organizational evolution calls for a higher requirement for the network governance which has 
not yet been fully addressed in current studies. For instance, Provan, Milward and Isett 
(2002)_ENREF_31 explained the core problem of organization network governance is 
governance mechanism  including commitment, contract and contract. However, they didn’t 
provide particular solutions for megaproject organizational governance which requires dynamic 
regimes and must adapt to the emerging context (Miller and Hobbs, 2005). Thus, the need for 
research on the dynamic organizational governance and strategy is essential for managing 
megaprojects. 
The analysis of the organization network can be performed by various methods such as 
mathematical statistics, computer simulation, and SNA. Among them, SNA is a widely adapted 
method for many fields (Chinowsky and Taylor, 2012), and it provides a new perspective and 
method to research project organization and the organization network (Li et al., 2011; Scott and 
Carrington, 2011). The origin of SNA can be traced back to the psychological study and 
anthropological study in the 1930s as a research paradigm (Kilduff and Tsai, 2003). SNA focuses 
on the study of both the relationship among all stakeholders and the overall structure of the 
network, including issues such as nodes, edges, network density, centrality, central potential, 
small group, location, role, and so on. For example, Pryke (2005) used SNA to study the 
effectiveness of project governance which can be significantly influenced by properly designing 
contracts, incentives, and information exchange relations. Chinowsky, Diekmann and O’Brien 
(2009) constructed a SNA model to analyse its impact on the project team performance. These 
studies show significant advantages in analysing the complex social relations in organization 
governance (Gray, 2001).  
Research Design and Data Processing 
Establishment of SNA model 
In order to analyse the structure of the network, the study needs to identify project participants 
from organizations or individuals, and their relations. Node, known as the "point", is the smallest 
unit of the network. In a project organization network, a node could be any project participant 
or stakeholder associated with this project. This study categorizes all relevant parties into four 
clusters: owners (investors), contractors, designers, and supervision units. 
Link, known as “edge” or “tie”, is defined as the connection between two nodes in the network. 
Link represents a specific or a substantive relationship in reality, with or without direction. In the 
SNA model of project organization, link represents project-based relationship, which could be 
the contract, command, coordination, information exchange, or performance incentive 
relationship.  
Since this study aims to investigate the evolution of the megaproject organization, which is based 
on the contractual and project collaborative relations, SNA network was selected and established 
as the non-directional and unweighted network. When a relationship exists, the link is 1, 
otherwise the link is 0. It is worth mentioning that the network structure only depends on the 
relationship existing among all the nodes but is irrelevant to individual project information. 
Indexes, called indicators, are the key to revealing the uniqueness and attributes in a SNA 
network. Through these indicators, one can not only conduct quantitative analysis for individual 
parties and connections, but also an overall analysis of an entire network, and therefore provide 
analytical results at both individual and network levels.  
In order to investigate characteristics and regularity of megaproject organization evolution, this 
study analyses specific attributes of organization network, including the closeness of network, 
connectivity of network, and position of network nodes. In particular, this study uses six 
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parameters to analyse the SNA result, as shown in Table 1. Closeness is measured by the density 
and clustering coefficient; whereas connectivity is measured by average path length and 
component; position of network node is measured by degree centrality and closeness centrality. 
The former four indicators measure the evolution of the overall network, while the latter two 
measure the evolution of individual nodes. All these indicators have been widely applied to 
existing studies, as shown in the last column of Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Selected SNA indicators for the analysis of megaproject organizational network 
Case selection  
This study selected a typical case of scientific and technological development park in Wuxi, 
China. Wuxi is a city located in the southern part of Jiangsu province, China, with a population 
of 550,000. Wuxi national hi-tech development zone (WNHTDZ) was founded in 1992, and 
listed as one of the nation’s high and new technology zones. Since 2005, WNHTDZ has entered 
a transition phase which requires massive transformation and infrastructure upgrade, so the 
demand of construction projects has also increased greatly.  
Currently, the total area of WNHTDZ has reached to 220 square kilometres, with total Gross 
Domestic Products (GDP) of 121.3 billion yuan (note: 1 yuan equals to 0.16 US dollar) in 2013. 
In the last eight years, the overall capacity of WNHTDZ, including both scale of industry and 
technological outputs, has been ranked second in Jiangsu province, and ranked first tier among 
all national development zones. Selecting WNHTDZ as a case can not only provide practical 
insights to the governance and management of local construction projects, but can potentially 
contribute to the understanding the governance of construction projects in other development 
zones. 
From 2008 to 2013, a total of 1897 new construction projects were approved in WNHTDZ, 
including 946 civil engineering projects (50%), 189 municipal engineering projects (10%) and 762 
industrial projects (40%). All projects can be classified into two categories: government invested 
projects (GIPs) and private invested projects (PIPs). The numbers of both GIPs and PIPs are 
shown in Table 2.  
Indicator Symbol Interpretation and calculations Reference 
Density △ 
Represent the closeness of a network 
Calculated by: the amount of  potential connections 
between individuals that are actually present 
(Jones et al., 
2011) 
Clustering 
Coefficient C 
An indication of the small world. 
Calculated by: the fraction of  connected triples in the 
graph that are triangle 
(Newman, 2003) 
Average Path 
Length d 
An indicator of the networks interconnectedness  
Calculated by: the average length of the shortest paths 
between all possible node pairs 
(Wasserman, 
1994) 
Component CO Represent network connectivity degree  Calculated by: a subset of nodes interconnected by edges 
(Liu, Han and 
Xu, 2014) 
Degree 
Centrality  ）（iCD  
Represent the level of  importance of  a particular node in a 
network. 
Calculated by: a count of the number of ties to other 
nodes in the network   
(Quinn, Chen 
and Mulvenna, 
2012) 
Closeness 
Centrality )(iCC  
Represent the degree of influence or control of a 
node by others. 
Calculated by: the sum of geodesic distances to all 
other nodes 
(Quinn, Chen 
and Mulvenna, 
2012) 
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To complete these projects, more than 1000 relevant companies were involved in the 
construction activities. These companies and their relations form a giant organizational network 
system with complex relationships. In addition, the construction of WNHTDZ is of a long 
duration and there are many organizational changes happening during the construction period. 
The combination of vast organizational network and its evolution present a great challenge to 
governance of the organizational network for WNHTDZ. Therefore, the selection of 
WNHTDZ as a typical case not only provides critical understanding of such mega scale 
organization governance, but also offers a generic solution to similar megaprojects in other 
regional development zones.   
 
Table 2: Numbers of government invested projects (GIPs) and private invested projects (PIPs) 
from 2008 to 2013 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
GIPs 53 71 89 63 64 33 
PIPs 279 217 345 352 205 126 
Data Collection and Processing 
One of the authors worked closely with WNHTDZ and collected second hand data since 2008. 
The data were extracted from the information system hosted by WNHTDZ administration. A 
total of 1,897 new construction projects that happened from 2008 to 2013 were selected as data 
input in SNA model. In order to guarantee the data validity, the study sorted, summarized, 
filtered, and cleaned the data after collection.  
The 1,897 construction projects and their relevant stakeholders have also been summarized. In 
total, there are 1450 contractors, including 680 owners (investors), 174 designers, 541 
contractors, and 55 supervision units. They involved all aspects of construction projects, such as 
the government regulations, fiscal and financing, planning, construction, environmental 
protection, and other departments, forming an open and complex organization system. To 
facilitate the SNA analysis, all associated projects and stakeholders were coded by the rules 
described in Table 3.  
On the basis of the coding, this study established the “two-mode network” (Doreian, Batagelj 
and Ferligoj, 2004) that represents the relationship between construction projects and 
participants. The matrix Bij was composed by constructing all participants and projects, where 
the row represents construction projects, starting with 1, 2, and so on, until 1897 ; the column 
represents all participants, starting with 1,2, and so on, until 1450. If Bij=1, then it represents 
that construction contractors j has involved in the construction project i, vice versa Bij = 0.  
As the purpose of this paper is to investigate the network relationship among project 
organizations, the “two-mode” network needs to be converted into the “one-mode” network 
(Doreian, Batagelj and Ferligoj, 2004) that represents the relationship among all participants. 
Such a conversion can be performed by using the adjacency matrix A, where  . 
If A = n, it means that there are n times of connections between node i and node k, indicated in 
a two-way arrow line; if A=0, it represents no connection between node i and node k. When two 
participants are involved in a project, they form a relationship and the link is 1. This is binary 
network in which the relationship between 0 and 1 is not taken into consideration. 
SNA Computation 
The study will consider six-years (2008-2013) of organizational evolution. In each year, the 
organizational network was computed based on the “2-year” rule, meaning that average 
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construction duration in WNHTDZ will last for 2 years. To align with this norm, the network in 
each year constituted all relevant participants in that particular year and also in the previous year. 
For instance, when calculating the network for 2012, all companies involved in 2012 and in 2011 
were considered in the network. This 2-year rule ensures the continuity and coherence of the 
SNA model with the construction practice.  
In addition, China’s high-speed infrastructure growth is based on the “dual-track” economy, 
where one force is from government investment, another force comes from the market driven 
competition. In this case, such “dual-track” system will be interpreted as GIPs and PIPs. A 
comparison between GIPs and PIPs shows significant influences for making future governance 
policy. Therefore, this study divides all project data into two parts, comparing GIPs to PIPs to 
find out different evolution rules and strategies. Finally, all calculations were fed in and solved by 
the SNA professional software, UNCINET6.0, and the result explained in the following section. 
 
Table 3: Participation unit and the coding method for construction projects 
 Participants Construction projects 
Example 
 
 
Code 
instructions 
• Company’s type includes the 
owners/investors (M), designers (A), 
contractors (C), and supervision units 
(S); 
• Company’s location 
represents the enterprise region. Local 
company in Wuxi city is marked 1, and 
foreign company is marked 2.  
• Company’s nature shows the 
primary shareholders of the enterprise, 
where state-owned enterprise is 1, 
private company is 2, foreign company 
is 3, and others is 4.  
• Serial number is the last three 
digits, which represent the running 
numbers.  
Example: Wuxi Shunfeng 
logistic company is marked as 
M13XXX. 
• Starting time and duration 
represent the project starting time (i.e. 
last 2 digits of a year, from 08 to 13), 
and the project duration for a project 
(i.e. 2 for 2 years),  
• Project type includes that A 
for civil projects, B for municipal 
project, and C for industrial projects  
• Investment property shows 
that the nature of the project 
investment, GIP is 0 and PIP is 1  
• Serial number is the last two 
digits, which represent the running 
numbers.  
X   X   X   XXX 
Serial number 
Company’s nature 
Company’s location 
 Company’s type 
XXX  X  X  XX 
Serial number 
  Investment property 
Project type 
Starting time and duration 
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Result and Analysis 
Overall network evolution process  
In last five years, the number of GIPs increased (see Figure 1), the number of links rose, and the 
collaboration network was greatly strengthened. Meanwhile, companies in the network can be 
divided into two parts  companies in the primary network (also known as a component that is 
a maximal set of nodes that are connected) and companies at the edge of the network. The latter 
part was gradually merged with the former part during the observation period. 
The PIPs network showed a high density from the start (see Figure 2), and has grown at a stable 
rate in five years. One interesting finding is that, between the years 2009 and 2014, although the 
number of nodes grows by 110 only (increased by 18%), the number of links almost doubled 
(increased by 194%), declaring a high connectivity of the whole network.  
Similar to GIPs network, companies at the edge of PIPs network gradually decreased and 
merged to the primary network as a component. The component (see Figure 3d) for both GIPs 
and PIPs increased shows that more companies were connected to the primary network, and 
fewer companies isolated. Such expanded primary network enables more collaboration among 
companies. 
Apart from the above, both the GIP and PIP networks belong to sparse network, with the 
network density of around 0.03 and 0.01 respectively, indicating low network collaboration. A 
possible explanation is due to the project tendering system, where the collaborative partners are 
selected by owners rather than by free selection, imposing restrictions on the emergence of large-
scale collaborative alliance. 
Comparative Analysis between GIPs and PIPs: Whole Network 
The comparison between GIPs and PIPs’ network is illustrated in Figure 3, and discussed as 
follows. GIPs have higher network density (0.03 vs. 0.01) and clustering coefficient (0.4 vs. 0.2) 
than PIPs (see Figure 3a and Figure 3b), indicating that GIPs have closer collaboration and high 
possibility of small clusters. The reason could be explained as follows. For GIPs, they are mainly 
affected by the government investment system, where one (government) owner typically 
corresponds to many projects, forming a more owner-centralized network. However, for PIPs, 
one (private) normally deals with one project at a time, constructing a one-to-one network. 
The collaborative degree of PIPs is relatively stable while the GIPs fluctuates over time (see 
Figure 3b and Figure 3b). This is mainly because PIPs are primarily oriented by the market 
mechanism which is relatively stable. However, the collaboration of GIPs was influenced by 
many government administrative interferences, such as new policies, rules and regulations, 
economic incentive plans, and so on. For instance, GIPs showed leadership in pioneering 
innovations, such as use of the new technology of Building Information Modelling (BIM) in 
buildings, and explored innovative project financing mechanisms, such as Public Private 
Partnership (PPP). Taking new initiatives will bring additional inputs to the network and may 
change the collaboration structure.  
The node distance of PIPs decreased sharply from 4.4 to 3.5 (see Figure 3c), indicating that the 
relationship between any two parties in the network is getting closer and the potential 
collaboration among companies is easier than ever, while the distance for GIPs was kept at a low 
level since 2009, and the trend only decreased slightly. In addition, the differences between the 
two types of project (GIPs and PIPs) have narrowed in the last five years. In 2009, a large gap 
existed for the average distance of the two types of network, with PIPs of 4.4 and GIPs of 3.4, 
respectively. But in 2013, the average distance of these two networks became quite similar, with 
PIPs of 3.5 and GIPs of 3.3 respectively. This indicates that, in the long term, the behaviour of 
different types of projects may tend towards “norm”. 
Construction Economics and Building, 15(3), 19-33  
 
Lu, Li, Pang and Zhang 26 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Organizational evolution of GIPs in WNHTDZ 
 
2009 (137 nodes and 568 connections) 2010 (178 nodes and 1033 connections) 2011 (201 nodes and 1166 connections) 
2012 (212 nodes and 1208 connections) 2013 (183 nodes and 1112 connections) 
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2009 (604 nodes and 2367 connections) 2010 (751 nodes and 3661 connections) 2011 (742 nodes and 5003 connections) 
  
 
2012 (794 nodes and 5289 connections) 2013 (714 nodes and 4582 connections)  
 
Figure 2: Organizational evolution of PIPs in WNHTDZ
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Figure 3: The comparison between GIPs and PIPs a) density, b) clustering coefficient, c) avarage 
path length, and d) the component 
Note: all indexes were standardized to ensure an effective comparison. 
 
Comparative analysis between GIPs and PIPs: individual nodes 
Degree centrality means the number of ties to other nodes that a node contains in the network, 
which is used to measure the node position in a network. In GIPs, design companies usually 
have higher degree centrality, while other companies vary widely. For instance, A12004 (notation 
is referred in Table 4) and A13028 are two main design companies. For PIPs, owners usually 
have higher degree centrality. Both M11219 and M11016 are main owners and also the most 
connected position in the network. 
Closeness centrality measures the ability of a node to be influenced or controlled by others. In 
GIPs, the trend is quite stable in which an owner (with M11219 based), a design company 
(A13039) and a construction company (C23174) normally top the list. They are also the key 
players who bridge the connections among different clusters. For PIPs, the top three companies 
vary randomly. 
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Table 4: Selected nodes ranked as top 3 for degree centrality and closeness centrality 
  2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 High frequent nodes* 
Degree 
centrality 
Top 3 nodes 
for GIP 
network 
A12004 
A13031 
A12009 
M12108 
A12004 
A12006 
M12108 
A12006 
A13028 
A12004 
A13039 
A13028 
S13005 
A13009 
A13028 
A12004 (3) 
A13028 (3) 
Top 3 nodes 
for PIP 
network 
A13039 
M11219  
M11013 
A13039  
M11219  
M11016 
A13039  
M11016  
M11219 
M11016  
A13039 
M11219 
M12108  
M11016  
M11219 
A13039 (4) 
M11219 (5) 
M11016 (4) 
Closeness 
centrality 
Top 3 nodes 
for GIP 
network 
A13039  
M11013  
C23174 
A13039  
C23174  
M11219 
A13039  
C23174  
M11219 
C23174  
A13039  
M11219 
C23174  
A13039  
M11219 
A13039 (5) 
C23174 (5) 
M11219 (4) 
Top 3 nodes 
for PIP 
network 
M12126  
A12004  
C22017 
A12004  
C22017  
M12108 
M12108  
M12126  
C13026 
M12108  
S13005  
A12004 
S13005  
A13028  
A13009 
A12004 (3) 
M12108 (3) 
*Note: High frequent nodes are explained in full name as follows. Wuxi Institute of Architectural 
Design Co. Ltd. (A12004); Wuxi Light Industry Design and Research Institute Co., Ltd. 
(A13028); Wuxi New District Wangzhuang Street Office (M11219); River Creek street Office 
(M11016); Wuxi civil design Co. (A13039)   
Governance Strategies 
Organizational evolution 
The evolutionary trend of organization network can be summarized as follows. First, GIPs 
network has more intense connections and smaller networks than PIPs network, indicating 
companies within GIPs network are more convenient to collaborate. Such high connection is 
mainly related to the government investment principles, management modes, and tendering 
system. Most GIPs were likely to be performed or supported by state-owned enterprise. So the 
owners of GIPs can have higher chance to continually work with past partners who also hope to 
obtain more projects. And the owners of PIPs are relatively dispersed across different fields, and 
many owners only have one project or one time investment, therefore the PIPs market is stable 
and its level of collaboration is low. 
Second, the evolution of the network indicates that for both GIPs and PIPs networks, 1) the 
collaboration closeness increased, and 2) the distance between companies decreased over time. 
This trend is more apparent for GIPs than PIPs, because government evaluated the post-project 
performance and set tendering priority to those good performers for future projects. This 
strengthens the relationship within the collaboration network. 
However, GIPs network shows more variances and fluctuations than PIPs network in terms of 
the value for density, clustering coefficient and component (see figure 3). This may due to the 
government procurement methods which use open tendering and lowest bid win principles. As a 
result, the lowest bidder may change for different projects. Such procurement policy may hinder 
the long-term collaborative partnerships.  
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Coping strategies 
Effective project governance is the key to project success (Klakegg, 2009). The purpose of 
project network governance is to help improve the project performance and stabilize the whole 
network. Procurement policy and contractual arrangements play an important role in project 
network governance, especially when governing a large project and its supply chain (Brady et al., 
2006). Olsen et al. (2005) stated that a governance structure should consist of multiple 
mechanisms such as contractual incentives, the use of contracts, relational norms, and 
administrative controls, in order to handle complex procurements for various stakeholders. The 
governance structure of a project encompasses the management of relationships among various 
project stakeholders (Artto, Eloranta and Kujala, 2008). In addition, a project contract is also 
intended to create a cooperative organization, where participating workers are motivated to work 
towards shared goals (Turner and Simister, 2001). 
In order to manage GIPs collaboration network effectively, well-designed policies such as 
procurement policy or contractual arrangement are needed. For PIPs, market-based policies with 
more incentive for collaborative mechanisms are needed, such as efficient market disciplines and 
tendering mechanisms. 
Based on the above organizational evolution, this study proposes several strategies to help 
govern the megaproject organization in a more efficient and reliable manner. Overall, managing 
GIPs collaboration network is essential to the success of the whole network. The closeness of 
collaboration in GIPs network needs well-designed policies, such as procurement policy or 
contractual arrangement, to guide companies building long-term collaboration, and also to help 
improve the performance of public project management. However, special focus should be given 
to the collaboration of the small cluster. Intimate relationships in a small cluster will lead to 
unfair competition, corruption, and eventually poor project performance. For instance, 
architecture and design firms are well connected to all other nodes, therefore it is vital to 
reconsider the governance mechanisms in order to monitor and to incentivize the influence of 
designers to the GIPs network. 
In addition, the evolution of GIPs network is not as stable as the PIPs network, meaning the 
management modes, rules, and mechanisms of GIPs might keep changing. Such frequent 
changes create difficulties for organizational governance. As Provan, Milward and Isett (2002) 
stated, the core issue of organization network governance is governance mechanisms, including 
commitments and contracts. Therefore, future management mode should be improved and 
relevant policies redesigned to stabilize the long-term collaborative network and strengthen the 
control. Powell (2003) suggested three ways of improving the governance of network 
organization including trust, learning and innovation. The future policy for this case could focus 
on 1) building the knowledge base of successful governance mechanisms, and 2) selecting and 
diffusing the effective governance mechanism in order to stabilize the collaborative networking 
features, and eventually to make the project network more controlled. 
The network character of PIPs is more stable than GIPs, and this suggests that the related 
market mechanism is relatively mature. Such a stable trend also reflects the success of previous 
policies by concentrating on market-based governance rather than project-based governance. 
Future policies can rely on market-based policies with more incentive for collaborative 
mechanisms, such as establishing efficient market disciplines, equitable legal system with 
mutually-supported guidance, efficient tendering mechanisms, and so on (Bresnen et al., 2003; 
Flyvbjerg, 2007). Meanwhile, owners located in core places within the PIPs network, and the 
management of owners’ behaviours should be highly monitored. 
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Conclusion  
This paper investigates the characteristics of the evolution of megaprojects organization in China 
by using SNA, comparing the organizational evolution of GIPs and PIPs networks, then 
proposing corresponding governance policies for both GIPs and PIPs. The key conclusion is as 
follows. 
The organization network of GIPs has higher closeness than PIPs, and therefore companies in 
GIPs have easier and better chances to collaborate with others. However, the network of GIPs 
fluctuated over time and required more stabilized governance polices. The collaboration network 
of PIPs has lower closeness, as private owners managed relatively small numbers of projects. 
The network character of PIPs is stable due to relatively matured market mechanisms. Therefore 
future policy will encourage more collaboration among the companies in the PIPs network.  
This research contributes to the body of knowledge by expanding the current research on the 
megaproject organizations from static evaluation to long-term evolutionary analysis, offering 
effective governance mechanisms for organizational dynamic evolution in different phases, and 
comparing various governance strategies for megaproject organizations. Although this study 
selected a typical case in Wuxi, the discussion and conclusion from this study could potentially 
contribute to understanding the governance of construction projects in other national 
development zones.  
However, several limitations exist in this research. First, the study only analyzes the overall 
characteristics of whole megaprojects organization network, but does not investigate the 
individual node and its influence in the network. Therefore future research can build a more 
holistic network to include both whole network analysis and individual node analysis. Second, 
this study focuses more on the performance of the organizational network, but hasn’t considered 
the performance of megaproject, such as the project quality, cost and schedule. Therefore, 
further study can establish the linkage between organization network and project performance in 
order to better understand the megaproject evolution. 
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